fragility of rights, but where do we go from here? She leaves us in the lurch. That is why I argue that we should fill this gap - at least regionally - though international organisations. It's not by chance that the Gypsies have asked to be recognised as *European* citizens. Since every nation-state rejects them they want the Union to protect them. I think that if the European Union is to be different from the nation-state, it should say to refugees and stateless minorities that they can become European citizens directly, without passing through a nation-state. But that is not something which is accepted now.

Raymond Aron pointed to the fact that the 'state can without self-contradiction grant aliens the economic and social rights it accords its own citizens and still refuse them political rights'. He insisted that the trend toward a multinational economic citizenship would not lead inevitably to a multinational political citizenship. Is this distinction between 'bourgeois' and 'citoyen' still relevant?

Yes. Economically, there is a world society, whereas, politically, the nation-state still exists. But we live in economic societies, which are more concerned with the individual and less with the state, and, to that extent, the difference between economics and politics and between citizens and foreigners is blurring.

About citizenship Aron was not a nationalist, but he had a classical view. His position was close to that of the British: he was for European cooperation, but he didn't believe that the nation-state was obsolete. For me, however, what's challenging about the European Union is that it's neither a new state nor simply an inter-state organisation like the UN. It's a kind of strange new animal which is somewhere in between, and our concepts of citizenship and loyalty have to adapt to that.

Aron was always a very logical, analytical, thinker; he tended to think in dichotomies, in which foreign and international affairs have to do with war and peace, and domestic affairs have to do with the rule of law. I find these distinctions too rigid and unhelpful. Perhaps in a period of transformation, reality cannot be sliced in this rigorous way: politics

is here, economics there, the domestic here, the international there. We have to adapt to a more contradictory situation. We are a little bit like people were in the middle ages, with multiple loyalties, with multiple types of political units, and I think our notions of citizenship should reflect that.

Do you agree with Hannah Arendt when she says that uprootedness is the condition of modernity?

Yes. But the interesting question is: what is the nature of roots? There are three hypotheses. One is that traditional society was based on the continuity of one place and one family, and modern conditions have said good-bye to all that. So, we used to be rooted and now we are not. The second is that man needs to be rooted and, in the absence of traditional roots, we are discovering other - not necessarily territorial - ways of finding our roots. Hence we are in a period of transition in which we don't have

our old roots and nor do we yet have new ones. The third is that the modern situation is telling us the truth about the human condition: that is, that man is rootless, but that he has all kinds of myths that make him believe that he is not.

Man has, in fact, both tendencies: a nostalgia for roots and a yearning to escape. Hegel says man is a sick animal: he can never find his place, he is not really happy roaming around nor really happy staying in one place. He is completely torn between the two. One could say that the myths about roots present us as if we were trees in the soil - with a definite place - but in fact only now do we really know that to have a place of our own, we must create it ourselves and even then it is only provisional. At any moment it can be changed through war, famine, ethnic cleansing, earthquakes, or anything else.

Professor Pierre Hassner, who was a student of Raymond Aron, lectures in international relations at CERI in Paris and is Governor of CSD's Council of Advisors. Bridget Cotter is a PhD candidate at CSD and a Visiting Lecturer in Political Theory at the University of Westminster. This is an excerpt from an interview conducted in Paris in July 1995.

Asian-style democracy?

by Takashi Inoguchi

In the past quarter century the number of democracies around the globe has quadrupled, from twenty-five to about 100. Perhaps as a consequence of this proliferation the world looks at democracy in new ways. Amongst the most significant of these is the view of democracy as a regional or cultural phenomenon, reflecting historical evolutionary paths that are different from those of the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy, with its American variant of federalism. 'Asian-style democracy' is often held to be one such variant.

In 1996, almost all of Pacific Asia is under some form of democracy. Only the remaining Communist states - China, North Korea, and Vietnam - the military dictatorship in Myanmar, and Brunei's monarchy cannot be described as democracies.

The world-wide explosion of democracy in the last quarter century has been accompanied by a quest for values, particularly values reflecting indigenous histories and sensibilities. Not all of these values are significant beyond the communities which generate them. A Tokyo neighbourhood may exercise a particularly vigorous form of local participation representation, reflecting, say, the older traditions of Shitamachi; but these say little to villagers in rural Thailand, or to teenagers in Singapore.

Asian values are, if anything, a broad spectrum of moral preferences, preferences that have emerged both from the ancient religions that unite the region and from the characteristic patterns of family and social structure. Not everyone agrees that these values exist, or are shared in common. The most vocal and articulate proponents of the notion of Asian values are in Malaysia and Singapore, though they can also be found in Japan, Korea, and China. They describe these values as a set of widely shared principles and practices with regard to community, order, hierarchy, individualism, mutual help, thrift, social deference, and self-sacrifice. They claim that the particular mix of values that exists in Pacific Asia is highly distinctive and different from value systems associated with other world civilisations, such as the Anglo-American value system, or the complex of values associated with Islam.

Almost all formulations of

Asian values assume a dichotomy between Asian and Western - particularly American - values. This debate often assumes aspects of a 'declaration of independence' from American cultural values. Thus, Asian values are identified as values neglected or even despised by Americans: for example, communitarian ties with neighbourhood, workplace and the state; respect for the elderly; an emphasis on education; and collective over individual welfare.

A dramatic example of Asian values is Singapore's introduction of legislation that makes it a crime for children to fail to support their parents, except in instances of egregious child abuse. This is communitarianism in action, Singapore-style. The legislation has two major purposes: one is to uphold the sanctity of family ties and the respect for age - both important components of the Asian value structure. The second is to place the onus for supporting the elderly on the public, thereby removing the burden from government as much as possible.

Pacific Asia's political institutions, too, have features that are different and even at odds with Western democracy. The region's democracies are not based on the Westminster model. Most of them combine a small and agile government with a system of one party or coalition rule. There are few instances of two-party systems with regular alternation of the governing party.

The typical political party in Pacific Asia is a catch-all organisation. Its policy tenets are vague, and it constructs and operates through extremely strong personal networks. The main function of political parties is to recruit support for the government at the grassroots level. There is a noticeable absence of parties based on ideological or religious tenets. In the Pacific Asian context, ideology normally hampers a party's ability to achieve power.

This political party structure works against any attempt to focus on single issues, or to take decisive action, because such an attempt would break the hard-won consensus. The political parties thus cede single issues and decision-making to the unelected bureaucrats, thus reinforcing bureaucratic rule.

The small, lean bureaucracies tend to be endowed with considerable authority, which enables them to adopt highly efficient strategies both for conforming to, and anticipating, markets. Typically, they also enjoy extremely high prestige and morale. They tend to see themselves as protectors of the people. However patronising such a conception may be, the bureaucracies are normally insulated from vested interests - unlike the politicians - and associate themselves and their role with the pursuit of the national interest. As long as the political parties are doing their job, placating grassroots interests and personalities, the bureaucracies are able to conduct their business free from distraction.

Professror Takashi Inoguchi is Senior Vice-Rector of the United Nations University (UNU), Tokyo, and a member of CSD's Council of Advisors. This is an edited version of a paper presented at the UNU/CSD conference, 'The Changing Nature of Democracy', held at St Antony's College, Oxford, in July 1996.